### 1NC Shell

#### The AFF’s approach to reduction of the natural world to a means of securing energy enframes existence, stripping beings of their very essence.

Beckman 0

[Tad, Harvey Mudd College, “Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,” [http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html //](http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html%20//) myost]

To uncover the essence of modern technology is to discover why technology stands today as the danger. To accomplish this insight, we must understand why modern technology must be viewed as a "challenging-forth," what affect this has on our relationship with nature, and how this relationship affects us. Is there really a difference? Has technology really left the domain of techne in a significant way? In modern technology, has human agency withdrawn in some way beyond involvement and, instead, acquired an attitude of violence with respect to the other causal factors? Heidegger clearly saw the development of "energy resources" as symbolic of this evolutionary path; while the transformation into modern technology undoubtedly began early, the first definitive signs of its new character began with the harnessing of energy resources, as we would say. [(7)](http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html#N_7_) As a representative of the old technology, the windmill took energy from the wind but converted it immediately into other manifestations such as the grinding of grain; the windmill did not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it for later arbitrary distribution. Modern wind-generators, on the other hand, convert the energy of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energy at our disposal; and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energy is, in this sense, the symbol of our over-coming of nature as a potent object. "...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit." {[7], p. 14} This and other examples that Heidegger used throughout this essay illustrate the difference between a technology that diverts the natural course cooperatively and modern technology that achieves the unnatural by force. Not only is this achieved by force but it is achieved by placing nature in our subjective context, setting aside natural processes entirely, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant only to human subjective needs. The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles "life and nature," in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, standing in reserve for our use. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as "standing-reserve" and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era of techne humans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design. (8)

#### The AFF is rife with examples of a thematic framing of human beings as benevolent protectors of the environment – monitoring, manipulating and controlling nature to ensure it functions in a systematically predictable way. This is a dangerous illusion that promotes futile managerial approaches to an untameable natural world.

#### Kuletz 98

[Valerie Kuletz, University of Canterbury. *The Tainted Desert: Environmental and Social Ruin in the American West*. New York: Routledge, 1998. 285-287. // myost]

We have seen how comparing two sets of perceptions about the environment and their intellectual lineages—the traditional Indian (specifically, the Western Shoshone, Southern Paiute, and Owens Valley Paiute) and the Western scientific—illuminates the limitations of each perspective, while simultaneously placing the two discourses on equal epistemological footing in such a way that one does not dominate the other due to its greater political power, or, as Bourdieu would say, "cultural capital."2 In some respects, this balancing act is an artificial one since Euroamerican scientific representations of the region enjoy far more legitimacy and political prestige than those of the region's indigenous population. Nevertheless, moving from one view to the other assists us in opening intellectual horizons onto the diversity of knowledge about place and nature that exist in this desert region. Comparing the two knowledge systems shows how environmental science, as a discipline and as practiced at Yucca Mountain, exists within a specific cultural and political context (and is a product of a specific cultural tradition), in the same way that Indian traditional knowledge about environment exists within a cultural context. However, because environmental science is the dominant narrative, its truth claims are "naturalized," that is, taken out of their cultural context and perceived as self-evident, so much so the the narratives that science constructs about the natural world become resistant to critical scrutiny, especially from those outside the discipline itself.3 The brief history of ecology, and ecosystems ecology in particular, in Chapter 9 illuminates some of the cultural and political factors that influence the Euroamerican perception of nature and that inform the Yucca Mountain Project—factors that exclude alternative perspectives that might jeopardize the project's implied political objective. By examining these factors in the larger context, we begin to see the powerful role of metaphors in scientific knowledge productions. They reveal the unstated assumptions from which we grasp the natural world and interpret it. When we describe the extended Yucca Mountain region as an "outdoor laboratory," the experimental landscape becomes a metaphorical landscape as much as a material reality. Metaphoricity and materiality are not, for human beings, separate entities. In using language science situates itself within culture and manifests a cultural production. Cybernetic terminology imposes human mechanistic, electrochemical conceptualizations onto nature; to a large extent people comprehend nature through their cultural productions—texts and machines. In this respect nature is what we make it. The ecosystem perspective identifies nature with energy conceptualized as work, with productivity conceptualized as the capacity to produce consumable materials, and with efficiency—all words that help to build an industrial, cybernetic-oriented, and economistic society. As the metaphors used to describe natural processes change through time from Clements's organism to Odum's electro-chemical circuit machine, it becomes impossible not to see our current late industrial, technocratic society reflected in our science. Today, the environmental economic discourse on productivity, with its organization of ecosystems according to capacities of "worldwide annual gross primary production"4 (see Figure 9.5) places Yucca Mountain as exceedingly low in the hierarchy of productivity, and thus deems it appropriate for nuclear waste disposal. But whose "productivity" are we talking about? Certainly not that of the Western Shoshone or Southern Paiute who have subsisted on the mountain's plants, animals, and water and who value the land in quite a different way. Science relies heavily on metaphors when representing nature.5 Ecology and, more specifically, the concept of the ecosystem are no exceptions. Here, economic and social metaphors proliferate to describe and explain nature. Many of these linguistic terms are politically motivated and are assertions of the status quo (stability, functionalist order, capitalist economics). Ironically, today, Indian pronouncements about nature are often dismissed as politically motivated. Why isn't such a phrase as "productive hierarchy" not seen as politically and culturally motivated, crafted to organize nature according to consumer interests? Indians claim that the land is sacred or holy homeland and thus should be under the care of the Native peoples. Capitalist Euroamericans say the land is resource rich and highly productive or unproductive and therefore should be used in various ways: for human consumption or for waste dumps. Which group—Native Americans or Euroamericans— is the more politically motivated? Our representations of the world wield great power. By identifying Yucca Mountain as a wasteland we legitimate actions that turn it into a wasteland. When we fill it with high-level nuclear waste, our actions suggest a belief that the earth is inert (because we need it to be) despite our knowledge of its dynamism. We downplay or ignore knowledge of a huge regional aquifer, numerous shallow volcanic aquifers, earthquake activity, and potential volcanic activity. Even in this dry, quiet landscape with its dense enduring rock, water moves—in its various forms. And the materials we fill the rock with also move, change with time. Heat and gases are emitted from decaying radioisotopes, moisture accumulates, and canisters corrode. The systems ecologists were right about one thing: Nature is dynamic, and high-level radioactive waste won't disappear. Eventually, it will he recycled back into the "system." It will accumulate in animals and humans down the food chain. If industry and the military continue to produce radioactive elements such as plutonium, they will become lively agents in a new kind of system that includes the transuranic elements, if not those who unleashed them. What the systems theorists mistook was the extent to which humans could control the system. Control in the cybernetic sense is different from "working with." It is analogous to the human control of other humans as governors of slaves. Eventually, the slaves revolt, become free radicals. If we can learn anything from the Indian perspective in this region it is that we need to afford all things some degree of subjectivity. Even when today's scientists well understand the limits of "objectivity," Euroamerican culture—including scientists—continue to proceed as though humans live outside the world they attempt to manipulate and control. Control is not all bad. But the belief in the right to control an objectified Other is dangerously illusory. The experiment at Yucca Mountain, and the history of that region show the illusion (indeed, the fantasy) of control for what it is. Much like the "Sorcerer's Apprentice" of the Disney cartoon, the product of our meddling with forces we don't entirely understand escapes our control—multiplying and taking on a life of its own.

#### The AFF’s ontology reduces the world to “Standing Reserve” to be called upon as it benefits the Self and refuses to value the world as anything else. This renders all beings objects—setting the tone for global warfare.

Zimmerman 81

[Michael E. Zimmerman, Tulane University. *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity*. 220-224. // myost]

In 1951 Heidegger noted that Spengler's idea of the "decline of the West" is "only the negative, though correct, consequence of Nietzsche's word, 'the wasteland grows'." (WHO, 14/38) Spengler's estimation is negative because it only describes the symptoms of decay, not the origins. Recalling the destruction caused by World War II, Heidegger asserted that the present spiritual devastation is more uncanny than physical destruction. "The devastation of the earth can easily go hand in hand with a guaranteed supreme living standard for [humans], and just as easily with the organized establishment of a uniform state of happiness for all [humanity]." (WHO, 11/29-30) He denied that he was part of the "chorus of voices" which condemned the "sickness" of Europe. While some writers took the easy road of describing the absurdity of modern life, Heidegger sought to discover the source of this absurdity. This source turns out to be: our destiny to understand ourselves as absolute subjects in a universe of commodities. Life in such a world cannot help but be absurd or, to use Heidegger's early terminology, inauthentic. Although technological culture is supposedly our destiny, Heidegger is not pleased with its traits—the self-sustaining, constantly expanding, and ultimately aimless systems of mass production and consumption; power politics; global warfare; mass-culture; and the collapse of great art, literature, philosophy, and religion. Already in "The Age of the World Picture" (1938), he writes that once the world becomes a mere picture (Bild) for the human subject, men contend for the "right" to organize the picture as it suits them. There arises the struggle of "world views," for whose sake "man brings into play his unlimited power for the calculating, planning, and molding of all things. Science as research is an absolutely necessary form of this establishing of self in the world...." (Hw, 87/135) Each competing world-view declares that its system of values best promotes human life; that is, the life of the people of the nation promoting the particular world-view. Values become nothing more than the "objectification of needs as goals." (Hw, 94/142) Refusing to acknowledge anything transcendent, nation-states try to dominate each other in their quest for markets, raw material, and "Lebensraum." Anything which enhances the power of the state, including the politicalization of education, art, religion, and science, is justified. (Nil, 28, 362-363) Production and consumption are, of course, organized as part of the push for total power. In a public lecture in 1939, Heidegger said that people expect that this drive for power necessarily establishes life-enhancing values, as if total mobilization were something in itself and not the organization of unconditioned senselessness for and from the Will to Power. Such power-empowering positings no longer direct themselves according to "masses" and "ideals," which could still be grounded in themselves; they stand "In the service" of the pure expansion of power and are evaluated only according to the thus esteemed economic value. The age of fulfilled senselessness is thus the time of the power-like discovery and accomplishment of "world-views," which drive all reckoning of re-presenting and re-producing [Vor- and Herstellens] to the uttermost extreme, because according to their essence they arise from a self-posited self-directing of mankind into beings and its [humankind's] unconditioned domination over all means of power of the earth and over [the earth] itself. (Nil, 21-22) The analysis of the clash of world-views was directed primarily against Germany under National Socialism, but against other Western nations as well. This is evident in a comment Heidegger made in 1940 concerning how one nation "justifies" all actions, so long as they promote greater power: "For example, if the English thoroughly blast the French fleet anchored in the harbor of Oran, this is from their power-standpoint wholly 'justified' [gerecht]; for 'justified' means only: what is useful for power-enhancement." (Nil, 198) This remarkable statement anticipated by almost two years the Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. The statement was made around the time Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland for reasons of "national security." When Heidegger said in 1951 that World War II "decided nothing" (WHO, 65/166), he did not mean that it was unimportant for Hitler to have been defeated. His point was that world wars arc only offshoots of the industrialization and "planetary imperialism" (Hw, 102/152-153) which are the key symptoms of the modem age. In a marginal note found in his own copy of his "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger wrote: "Industrial society as the authoritative subject-and thinking as 'politics'."13 World wars are ways of shoring up faltering economies; wars provide "the stability of a constant form of using things up." Leaders of power-hungry nations are not merely individuals caught up in the "blind rage of a selfish egoism," but are instruments of world-destiny. (VA, I, 84-85/104-105) Everything is planned for the sake of accelerating the process of production and consumption, as Ernst Jiinger pointed out in the 1920s.14 The push for power will finally lead to attempts to "breed" human beings in factories, because humans are the most important raw material. The increase in the number of masses of human beings is done explicitly by plan so that the opportunity will never run out for claiming more "room to live" for the large masses whose size then requires correspondingly higher masses of human beings for their arrangement. This circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption is the sole procedure which distinctively characterizes the history of a world which has become an unworld. (VA, I, 88/107) The Will to Power manifests itself primarily, therefore, in economic terms. Self-willed man turns everything into a commodity. [Man] himself, along with everything else, is turned into a "calculated market value" of a world-wide market. (Hw, 270/114-115) Heidegger was aware of the international corporations which ignore national boundaries in the search for cheaper material, labor, and new markets.15 In the world run by corporate interests, everyday life becomes the effort to succeed in the marketplace. (Hw, 290/136) Heidegger sounds like Marx in saying: Self-willed man reckons everywhere with things and men as with objects. What is so reckoned becomes merchandise. Everything is constantly changed about into new orders.... Self-assertive man lives by staking his will. He lives essentially by risking his essence [Wesen] in the vibration of money and the currency [Geltens] of values. As the constant trader and middleman, man is the "merchant." He weighs and measures constantly, yet does not know the real weight of things. He also does not know what in himself has authentic weight [Gewicht] and prevails [iiberwiegt]. (Hw, 289/135) Everyday life is determined according to the demands of the economic system. In this hectic world, we no longer understand death, pain, or love. (Hw, 253/96) We are uprooted and alienated; great masses move across continents in search of "better opportunities," "personal improvement," and a "higher standard of living"; the self disappears in the process of production (ZSF, 74/75); rivers and streams become sewers; the air is poisoned; forests are annihilated; mountains are flattened for their ore, or to make room for highways; farms become "agri-business" operations which degrade the soil with the imposition of artificial fertilizers and pesticides; homes become high-rise apartment complexes; work becomes repetitive, simplified, and boring; biochemists study how to manipulate man's genetic structure; and all of this happens under the aegis of self-development, self-emancipation, and progress. No human action can bring about a change in the technological impulse, for "Self-assertive [human]...is the functionary of Technik." (Hw, 271/116)16 The momentum of the technological Will to Power has outstripped [humanity's] capacity to control it. (G, 19/51) Before World War II, Heidegger speculated that "Before Being can occur in its primal truth, Being as the will must be broken, the world must be forced to collapse and the earth must be driven to desolation, and [human] to mere labor." (VI, I, 65/86) But even the devastation of the wars did not essentially change the situation in the modern world. Human life in the technological age bears important similarities to what Heidegger called "inauthentic everydayness" in Being and Time. There he suggested that inauthenticity resulted when an individual chose to conceal the truth. In his later work, he argues that inauthenticity reigns because humanity has become the self-certain subject who yearns to dominate everything. Heidegger personifies the subject, talking as if it were a conscious agent manipulating individuals to act according to its dictates. He makes individuals appear to be functions of the subject in a way analogous to how Marx makes them appear to be functions of "Lord Capital." In Capital, we read: As the conscious bearer of this movement [of capital], the possessor of money becomes a capitalist. His person, or rather his pocket, is the point from which the money starts, and to which it returns. The objective content of the circulation we have been discussing—the valorization of value—is his subjective purpose, and it is only insofar as the appropriation of ever more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving force behind his operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e., as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and will. Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit of any single transaction. This boundless drive for enrichment, this passionate chase after value, is common to the capitalist and the miser, but while the miser is merely a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist is a rational miser.

#### The AFF prescribes an otherizing discourse that serves to re-legitimate our position of power—this seeks to affirm our rationality while assuming the non-western world is driven by irrational impulses and incapable of securing fissile materials.

Gusterson 99

[Hugh, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination,” Cultural Anthropology 14.1 (Feb 1999): 111-143.] // myost

**Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not**. During the Cold **War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals** (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). **The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries.**6 **This inscription of Third World** (especially Asian and Middle Eastern**) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism"** by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that **orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics**. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, **in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development** or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that **another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse**.

#### The AFF is part and parcel of a larger narrative of US exceptionalism—their assertion that the international arena can be rationally known and ordered springs from an epistemology which treats beings as objects—setting the stage for endless imperial violence

Spanos 3

[William V., Distinguished Professor of English at SUNY–Binghamton, “A Rumor of War: 9/11 and the Forgetting of the Vietnam War,” *boundary 2* 30.3 (2003): 29-66. // myost]

The other difference, indissolubly associated with the first, is that, despite its infinitely more powerful military might, the United States lost the war to the recalcitrant Other it would subdue and accommodate. And it lost it because in this globalized postcolonial context—that is, by way of the disclosures released by the self-destruction of the end-oriented philosophical, epistemological, and cultural mechanisms of Western imperialism—America's Other, as Caputo testifies synecdochically, refused to be answerable to the American exceptionalist narrative. Its response rather was to be rhizomatically mobile, strategically indeterminate in its goals, erratic in its actions, indifferent to temporal and spatial boundaries, resistant (in its attunement to the slow motion of being) to the dictates of technological speed, and, not least, invisible to America's Ahabian gaze, all calculated to decompose the relay of American power extending back from its forward-oriented military machine, through its progressivist capitalist cultural apparatuses, to the instrumentalist (Franklinian "can-do") thinking that was planning and conducting the war from the Pentagon. This double difference, despite his effort to personalize and then assimilate this war to war in general is, as I have tried to show, the symptomatic testimony of Caputo's representative memoir A Rumor of War. And it is the specter of this witness to the visible contradiction between America's ontological justification of the Vietnam War and its Ahabian practice that has haunted American foreign policy since the fall of Saigon in 1975 and explains the dominant culture's obsessive will to forget Vietnam since then—an amnesiac process apparently culminating in the Gulf War and a triumphant "end-of-history" discourse—and its studied avoidance of reference to the Vietnam War in its effort to justify to the American people and the world at large its ferocious retaliatory attack on Afghanistan. [End Page 62] This double difference, I submit, is also why it is imperative that intellectuals who oppose the United States' representation and conduct of the "war against terrorism" retrieve the forgotten memory of the Vietnam War as Caputo's deeply backgrounded, representative text articulates it. For, as I hope I have shown, it is not simply its spectral witness to the terror of America's exceptionalist "search-and-destroy" mentality that, despite the sustained attempt to obliterate it from its history, continues to haunt the present American government's—and the American media's—concentering personification of the complex global conditions, which America itself has largely produced, in the name of its exceptionalist mission in the world's wilderness, in the demonized symbolic figure of Osama bin Laden, its most recent Moby Dick. It is also the Vietnam War's spectral witness to a mighty America's humiliating defeat at the hands of an Other—its Other—which refused to accommodate itself to America's exceptionalist story in Southeast Asia that now haunts America's metaphysical, epistemological, cultural, military, and political project against a decidedly undecidable "enemy" in the Middle East, a diverse and amorphous area of the world that has for centuries suffered the terrible human consequences of being the second, essentialized, term in the Occident's binary logic, and thus is as likely as Vietnam to turn the United States' power against itself. To put all this another way, the United States will no doubt succeed in its military mission to defeat the Taliban and (less certainly) to re-create an Afghanistan nation-state in its own image (as it did—several times—in Vietnam in the early years of the war). It may even capture and bring Osama bin Laden to trial (even, against the judicial tradition of democracy, to be tried by a military court). But granted this successful "accomplishment," it is no more likely to annul or even assuage the outrage that the United States has increasingly ignited in the Islamic world at large by its concentering of the cultural, social, and political global morass its exceptionalist ethos has produced and is producing than Captain Ahab's "monomania"—his concentering reduction of the ineffable being of being ("All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lee of things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks and sinews and cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought") to Moby Dick—was able to annul the self-defensive outrage of the white whale. Perhaps what I am suggesting by way of invoking the witness of the Vietnam War about the ultimate consequences of America's response to the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon will become unequivocally manifest by reconstellating both these moments of American history [End Page 63] into the "hidden history of the Revolutionary Atlantic" (the period extending from the origins of the Atlantic slave trade to the Revolutionary years) retrieved by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker from the oblivion to which it has been relegated by the "Herculean" monumentalist historians of this "glorious" earlier epochal moment of the march of Western civilization: The classically educated architects of the Atlantic economy found in Hercules . . . a symbol of power and order. For inspiration they looked to the Greeks, for whom Hercules was a unifier of the centralized territorial state, and to the Romans, for whom he signified vast imperial ambition. The labors of Hercules symbolized economic development: clearing of land, the draining of swamps, and the development of agriculture, as well as the domestication of livestock, the establishment of commerce, and the introduction of technology. The rulers placed the image of Hercules on money and seals, in pictures, sculptures, and palaces, and on arches of triumph. . . . John Adams, for his part, proposed in 1776 that "The Judgment of Hercules" be the seal for the new United States of America. . . . These same rulers found in the many-headed hydra an antithetical symbol of disorder and resistance, a powerful threat to the building of state, empire, and capitalism. The second labor of Hercules was the destruction of the venomous hydra of Lerna. . . . From the beginning of English colonial expansion in the early seventeenth century through the metropolitan industrialization of the early nineteenth, rulers referred to the Hercules-hydra myth to describe the difficulty of imposing order on increasingly global systems of labor. They variously designated dispossessed commoners, transported felons, indentured servants, religious radicals, pirates, urban laborers, soldiers, sailors, and African slaves as the numerous ever-changing heads of the monster. But the heads, though originally brought into productive combination by their Herculean rulers, soon developed among themselves new forms of cooperation against those rulers, from mutinies and strikes to riots and insurrections and revolution. 24 As Caputo and virtually every American soldier who fought in Vietnam reiteratively testify, the insurgents of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, [End Page 64] like the many-headed hydra of European antiquity (and of the Revolutionary Atlantic economy), were constantly defeated by the "Herculean" American military juggernaut, but they nevertheless kept rising up in unpredictable places and times to eventually bring their would-be monster-slayer to a dead end. Given the incommensurability of America's predictable invocation of the (mythical) logic of exceptionalism and the postcolonial condition, there is little reason to believe that the hatred precipitated by the United States' perennial unilateral "defense" of its "interests" in the Islamic world—a defense expedited by its reduction of the diversity of this world to an abstract and predictable stereotype—will not also manifest itself as a "many-headed hydra" that will resurface in unexpected places at unexpected times to constantly molecularize, and neutralize the power of, the concentering Ahabian American narrative, its self-present will, and its forwarding military machine. The lesson the Vietnam War should have taught America, but apparently has not, is that in this globalized postcolonial age, only a rethinking of America's perennial exceptionalist mission in the world's "wilderness"—a rethinking that must be genealogical, that must, in other words, understand America's modern (instrumentalist) foreign policy in the light of the very formation of the American national identity—will resolve the complex global conditions that are the dark legacy of Western imperialism. Only such a radical genealogical rethinking of America's role in the world will be able to negate the present historical context, which promises not the Pax Americana but, as even the Bush administration acknowledges when its deputies remind the American public that the war against terror does not have a foreseeable end, an ongoing, undecidable war against an undecidable enemy—not to say the establishment of a perpetual national state of emergency that will play havoc on the civil rights of the American people.

#### The AFF’s representations of nuclear war as catastrophe render invisible the ongoing violence against the Fourth World. This de-historicization of nuclear conflict authorizes limitless violence and genocide.

Kato 93

[Masahide, Professor in Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu; “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Alternatives, Volume 18, Number 3, Summer 1993, pg. 347-349, ISSN 0304-3754. // Ether]

The vigorous invasion of the logic of capitalist accumulation into the last vestige of relatively autonomous space in the periphery under late capitalism is propelled not only by the desire for incorporating every fabric of the society into the division of labor but also by the desire for "pure" destruction/extermination of the periphery." The penetration of capital into the social fabric and the destruction of nature and preexisting social organizations by capital are not separable. However, what we have witnessed in the phase of late capitalism is a rapid intensification of the destruction and extermination of the periphery. In this context, capital is no longer interested in incorporating some parts of the periphery into the international division of labor. The emergence of such "pure" destruction/extermination of the periphery can be explained, at least partially, by another problematic of late capitalism formulated by Ernest Mandel: the mass production of the means of destruction." Particularly, the latest phase of capitalism distinguishes itself from the earlier phases in its production of the "ultimate" means of destruction/extermination, i.e., nuclear weapons. Let us recall our earlier discussion about the critical historical conjuncture where the notion of "strategy" changed its nature and became deregulated/dispersed beyond the boundaries set by the interimperial rivalry. Herein, the perception of the ultimate means of destruction can be historically contextualized. The only instances of real nuclear catastrophe perceived and thus given due recognition by the First World community are the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which occurred at this conjuncture. Beyond this historical threshold, whose meaning is relevant only to the interimperial rivalry, the nuclear catastrophe is confined to the realm of fantasy, for instance, apocalyptic imagery. And yet how can one deny the crude fact that nuclear war has been taking place on this earth in the name of "nuclear testing" since the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo in 1945? As of 1991, 1,924 nuclear explosions have occurred on earth." The major perpetrators of nuclear warfare are the United States (936 times), the former Soviet Union (715 times), France (192times), the United Kingdom (44 times), and China (36 times)." The primary targets of warfare ("test site" to use Nuke Speak terminology) have been invariably the sovereign nations of Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. Thus history has already witnessed the nuclear wars against the Marshall Islands (66 times), French Polynesia (175 times), Australian Aborigines (9 times), Newe Sogobia (the Western Shoshone Nation) (814 times), the Christmas Islands (24 times), Hawaii (Kalama Island, also known as Johnston Island) (12 times), the Republic of Kazakhstan (467 times), and Uighur (Xinjian Province, China) (36 times)." Moreover, although I focus primarily on "nuclear tests" in this article, if we are to expand the notion of nuclear warfare to include any kind of violence accrued from the nuclear fuel cycle (particularly uranium mining and disposition of nuclear wastes), we must enlist Japan and the European nations as perpetrators and add the Navaho, Havasupai and other Indigenous Nations to the list of targets. Viewed as a whole, nuclear war, albeit undeclared, has been waged against the Fourth World, and Indigenous Nations. The dismal consequences of "intensive exploitation," "low intensity intervention," or the "nullification of the sovereignty" in the Third World produced by the First World have taken a form of nuclear extermination in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations. Thus, from the perspectives of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations, the nuclear catastrophe has never been the "unthinkable" single catastrophe but the real catastrophe of repetitive and ongoing nuclear explosions and exposure to radioactivity. Nevertheless, ongoing nuclear wars have been subordinated to the imaginary grand catastrophe by rendering them as mere preludes to the apocalypse. As a consequence, the history and ongoing processes of nuclear explosions as war have been totally wiped out from the history and consciousness of the First World community. Such a discursive strategy that aims to mask the "real" of nuclear warfare in the domain of imagery of nuclear catastrophe can be observed even in Stewart Firth's Nuclear Playground, which extensively covers the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific: Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere . . . were global in effect. The winds and seas carried radioactive contamination over vast areas of the fragile ecosphere on which we all depend for our survival and which we call the earth. In preparing for war, we were poisoning our planet and going into battle against nature itself. Although Firth's book is definitely a remarkablde study of the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific, the problematic division/distinction between the "nuclear explosions" and the nuclear war is kept intact. The imagery of final nuclear war narrated with the problematic use of the subject ("we") is located higher than the "real" of nuclear warfare in terms of discursive value. This ideological division/hierarchization is the very vehicle through which the history and the ongoing processes of the destruction of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations by means of nuclear violence are obliterated and hence legitimatized. The discursive containment/obliteration of the "real" of nuclear warfare has been accomplished, ironic as it may sound, by nuclear criticism. Nuclear criticism, with its firm commitment to global discourse, has established the unshakable authority of the imagery of nuclear catastrophe over the real nuclear catastrophe happening in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations almost on a daily basis.

#### The alternative is to do nothing. This isn't a question of passivity but of a releasement from the Will to Technology and an openness to the mystery of Being which transcends activity. Only such an ontological disarmament inaugurates new modes of revealing that don't depend on the world's subordination to human motivations.

McWhorter 92

[Ladelle McWhorter, University of Richmond. *Heidegger and the Earth: Issues in Environmental Philosophy*. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 1992. 3-7. // myost]

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call, and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities. Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do – nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox: how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate. But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question."3 Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human. What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers - of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies - so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify? In numerous essays - in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" - Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our, age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness - a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery’. It would be easy to imagine that by 'the mystery' Heidegger means some sort of entity, some thing, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But 'the mystery’ is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing. Every academic discipline, whether it be biology or history, anthropology or mathematics, is interested in discovery, in the revelation of new truths. Knowledge, at least as it is institutionalized in the modern world, is concerned, then, with what Heidegger would call revealing, the bringing to light, or the coming to presence of things. However, in order for any of this revealing to occur, Heidegger says, concealing must also occur. Revealing and concealing belong together. Now, what does this mean? We know that in order to pay attention to one thing, we must stop paying close attention to something else. In order to read philosophy we must stop reading cereal boxes. In order to attend to the needs of students we must sacrifice some of our research time. Allowing for one thing to reveal itself means allowing for the concealing of something else. All revealing comes at the price of concomitant concealment. But this is more than just a kind of Kantian acknowledgment of human limitation. Heidegger is not simply dressing up the obvious, that is, the fact that no individual can undergo two different experiences simultaneously. His is not a point about human subjectivity at all. Rather, it is a point about revealing itself. When revealing reveals itself as temporally linear and causally ordered, for example, it cannot simultaneously reveal itself as ordered by song and unfolding in dream. Furthermore, in revealing, revealing itself is concealed in order for what is revealed to come forth. Thus, when revealing occurs concealing occurs as well. The two events are one and cannot be separated.4 Too often we forget. The radiance of revelation blinds us both to its own event and to the shadows that it casts, so that revealing conceals itself and its self-concealing conceals itself, and we fall prey to that strange power of vision to consign to oblivion whatever cannot be seen. Even our forgetting is forgotten, and all traces of absence absent themselves from our world. The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book A Brief History of Time, writes, "The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe."5 Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed. This dream of Hawking's is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power, absolute control. It is a dream of the ultimate managerial Utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything. But it is only a dream, itself predicated, ironically enough, upon concealment, the self-concealing of the mystery. We can never control-the mystery the belonging together of revealing and concealing. In order to approach the world in a manner exclusively technological, calculative, mathematical, scientific, we must already have given up (or lost, or been expelled by, or perhaps ways of being such as we are even impossible within) other approaches or modes of revealing that would unfold into knowledges of other sorts. Those other approaches or paths of thinking must already have been obliterated; those other knowledges must already have concealed themselves in order for technological or scientific revelation to occur. The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking - couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent - is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream. And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, our very selves - selves engineered by the technologies of power that shaped, that are, modernity - are at stake. Any thinking that threatens the notion of human being as modernity has posited it - as rationally self-interested individual, as self-possessed bearer of rights and obligations, as active mental and moral agent - is thinking that threatens our very being, the configurations of subjective existence in our age.

## Case Cards

#### **Water doesn’t cause war- 4 reasons:****Lawfield 10** – Thomas Lawfield is an MA candidate at the University for Peace. Water Security: War or Peace? Thomas Lawfield May 03, 2010 <http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715> I

In reality, water does not cause war. The arguments presented above, although correct in principle, have little purchase in empirical evidence. Indeed, as one author notes, there is only one case of a war where the formal declaration of war was over water.[[20]](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715" \l "_ftn20) This was an incident between two Mesopotamian city states, Lagash and Umma, over 2,500 years BC, in modern day southern Iraq. Both the initial premises and arguments of water war theorists have been brought into question. Given this, a number of areas of contestation have emerged: "Questioning both the supply and demand side of the water war argument [...] Questioning assumptions about the costs of water resources [...and] Demonstrating the cooperative potential of the water resource."[[21]](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715" \l "_ftn21) Why then is water not a cause of war? The answer lies in two factors: *first*, the capacity for adaptation to water stresses and, second, the political drawbacks to coupling water and conflict. First, there is no water crisis, or more correctly, there are a number of adaptation strategies that reduce stress on water resources and so make conflict less likely. Unlike the water war discourse, which perceives water as finite in the Malthusian sense, the capacity for adaptation to water stress has been greatly underestimated. For instance, I will discuss in particular a trading adaptation known as ‘virtual water’, which refers to the water used to grow imported food. This water can be subtracted from the total projected agricultural water needs of a state, and hence allows water scarce states to operate on a lower in-country water requirement than would otherwise be expected.[[22]](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715" \l "_ftn22) This means that regions of the world that are particularly rich in water produce water intense agricultural products more easily in the global trade system, while other water scarce areas produce low intensity products.[[23]](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715" \l "_ftn23) The scale of this water is significant - Allan famously pointed out that more embedded water flows into the Middle East in the form of grain than flows in the Nile.[[24]](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715" \l "_ftn24) In addition, there are significant problems around the hegemonic doctrine of the water crisis. Many authors point to relatively low water provision per capita by states, and suggest that this will increase the likelihood of a state engaging in war with a neighbouring state, to obtain the water necessary for its population. This is normally a conceptual leap that produces the incorrect corollary of conflict, but is also frequently a problem of data weaknesses around the per capita requirements. For instance, Stucki cites the case of the Palestinians being under the worst water stress, with a per capita provision being in the region of 165m³/year.[[25]](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715" \l "_ftn25) Unfortunately, such an analysis is based on false actual provision data in this region. Based on the authors work on water provision in Lebanese Palestinian refugee camps, the actual provision is over 90m³/month. Such a figure is highly likely to be representative of other camps in the region.[[26]](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715" \l "_ftn26) If this example is representative of trends to exaggerate water pressures in the region, then we should be sceptical about claims of increasing water stress. Furthermore, given that many water systems have a pipe leakage rate of fifty per cent, combined with a seventy per cent loss of agricultural water, significant efficiency enhancements could be made to existing infrastructure. Combined with desalination options in many water shortage prone states, there is an overall capacity for technological and market driven solutions to water scarcity.[[27]](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715" \l "_ftn27) *Second*, water wars are not caused by water, but rather an inability of politics. Barnett makes the case clear by arguing that water war would be a ‘failure of politics’ rather than the outcome of justified demands for essential resources.[[28]](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715" \l "_ftn28) In this way, it is not scarcity that is the driver in the Malthusian sense, but a political, and politicised issue. This is most noticeable where conflict occurs in areas where there are both political tensions and water resources challenges. For example, there are absurd and exaggerated claims of a linkage between Israel’s water management and surrounding states. In reality, conflict in this region is strongly influenced by political circumstance that speaks to a wider discourse around Israel’s position in the Near East. That environmental constraints and pressures are woven into wider discourses of politics is no indication that they are the cause of conflict, but rather more that they are an important contextual factor that may be mobilised for political reasons. For instance, in 2000 Lebanon started building a small pumping station on the Wazzani river which is used by downstream Israel. This rapidly became a media issue in Israel, probably due to the heightened security discourse surrounding water. Claims were made that the action was comparable to the 1964 diversion of the Hasbani, an Arab coalition move to harm the Israeli economy. However, the story diminished even faster than it emerged, when officials on both sides showed their dismay at the emerging media frenzy.[[29]](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715" \l "_ftn29) There are two key trends to note from this example: *first*, that wider discussions around water wars influence the articulation of war in reality, and second the water component of the conflict is not significant, rather it acts as a trigger for the utilisation of wider political narratives. In essence, water is merely a tool for political ends. *Third*, war over water is illogical. States are not inherently belligerent, but act in self interested, utility-maximising ways. Rather, they engage in conflict if they stand to gain more than they loose. In the case of water, the costs of military engagement far outweigh the costs of cooperative engagement. For instance, Baskin points out that it would cost more for Israel to engage in war for the water resources of the West Bank than it would to buy the equivalent of the West Banks aquifers from elsewhere

#### Their economic projections are the same ones which failed to predict the financial crisis, and turn the case—the assumptions of a rational economic agent make collapse inevitable

#### Stiglitz 10

[Joseph, Columbia University, “Needed: a new economic paradigm,” 19 August 2010, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d5108f90-abc2-11df-9f02-00144feabdc0.html#axzz27bcq39SH>] // myost

The blame game continues over who is responsible for the worst recession since the Great Depression – the financiers who did such a bad job of managing risk or the regulators who failed to stop them. But the economics profession bears more than a little culpability. It provided the models that gave comfort to regulators that markets could be self-regulated; that they were efficient and self-correcting. The efficient markets hypothesis – the notion that market prices fully revealed all the relevant information – ruled the day. Today, **not only is our economy in a shambles but so too is the economic paradigm that predominated in the years before the crisis – or at least it should be.** It is hard for non-economists to understand how peculiar the predominant macroeconomic models were. Many assumed demand had to equal supply – and that meant there could be no unemployment. (Right now a lot of people are just enjoying an extra dose of leisure; why they are unhappy is a matter for psychiatry, not economics.) Many used “representative agent models” – all individuals were assumed to be identical, and this meant there could be no meaningful financial markets (who would be lending money to whom?). Information asymmetries, the cornerstone of modern economics, also had no place: they could arise only if individuals suffered from acute schizophrenia, an assumption incompatible with another of the favoured assumptions, full rationality. **Bad models lead to bad policy: central banks, for instance, focused on the small economic inefficiencies arising from inflation, to the exclusion of the far, far greater inefficiencies arising from dysfunctional financial markets and asset price bubbles. After all, their models said that financial markets were always efficient. Remarkably, standard macroeconomic models did not even incorporate adequate analyses of banks.** No wonder former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, in his famous mea culpa, could express his surprise that banks did not do a better job at risk management. The real surprise was his surprise**: even a cursory look at the perverse incentives confronting banks and their managers would have predicted short-sighted behaviour with excessive risk-taking.** The standard models should be graded on their predictive ability – and especially their ability to predict in circumstances that matter. Increasing the accuracy of forecast in normal times (knowing whether the economy will grow at 2.4 per cent or 2.5 per cent) is far less important than knowing the risk of a major recession. In this **the models failed miserably, and the predictions of policymakers based on them have, by now, totally undermined their credibility. Policymakers did not see the crisis coming, said its effects were contained after the bubble burst, and thought the consequences would be far more short-lived and less severe than they have been.** Fortunately, while much of the mainstream focused on these flawed models, numerous researchers were engaged in developing alternative approaches. Economic theory had already shown that many of the central conclusions of the standard model were not robust – that is, small changes in assumptions led to large changes in conclusions. Even small information asymmetries, or imperfections in risk markets, meant that markets were not efficient. Celebrated results, such as Adam Smith’s invisible hand, did not hold; the invisible hand was invisible because it was not there. Few today would argue that bank managers, in their pursuit of their self-interest, had promoted the well-being of the global economy. **Monetary policy affects the economy through the availability of credit – and the terms on which it is made available, especially to small- and medium-sized enterprises. Understanding this requires us to analyse banks and their interaction with the shadow banking sector.** The spread between the Treasury bill rate and lending rates can change markedly. With a few exceptions, most central banks paid little attention to systemic risk and the risks posed by credit interlinkages. **Years before the crisis, a few researchers focused on these issues, including the possibility of the bankruptcy cascades that were to play out in such an important way in the crisis. This is an example of the importance of modelling carefully complex interactions among economic agents** (households, companies, banks) – **interactions that cannot be studied in models in which everyone is assumed to be the same. Even the sacrosanct assumption of rationality has been attacked: there are systemic deviations from rationality and consequences for macroeconomic behaviour that need to be explored.** Changing paradigms is not easy. Too many have invested too much in the wrong models. Like the Ptolemaic attempts to preserve earth-centric views of the universe, there will be heroic efforts to add complexities and refinements to the standard paradigm. The resulting models will be an improvement and policies based on them may do better, but they too are likely to fail. Nothing less than a paradigm shift will do. But a new paradigm, I believe, is within our grasp: the intellectual building blocks are there and the Institute for New Economic Thinking is providing a framework for bringing the diverse group of scholars striving to create this new paradigm together**. What is at stake, of course, is more than just the credibility of the economics profession or that of the policymakers who rely on their ideas: it is the stability and prosperity of our economies.**

### Prolif Turn

**SMR leads to prolif- even those in favor of the plan see the risk**

**Smith 11** (Terrence P, February, analyst for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”, ([http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations)CD](http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations%29CD))

The report repeatedly emphasizes the point that “DOD’s “’first mover’ pursuit of small reactors could have a profound influence on the development of the industry,” and cautions that “if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies.” **The U.S. nonproliferation agenda, if there is one, stands in opposition to this line of thinking. Pursuing a nuclear technology out of the fear that others will get it** (or have it), is **what fueled the Cold War and much of the proliferation we have seen and are seeing today. It is a mentality I think we should avoid.¶** I do not mean to say this report ignores the risks. In fact they explicitly say, “**We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors.”** For example it says,¶ **Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors. ¶** The report also points out that “**from a financial perspective, small reactors represent substantial losses in economies of scale.”¶** These issues, which were briefly mentioned, hardly seem like small potatoes. The reports answer to the issues raised: “making reliable projections about these reactors’ economic and technical performance while they are still on paper is a significant challenge,” and “**Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple.**”¶ On the other hand, the report argues, “failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD.” “First, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries.”¶ Yes these are important issue for a business stand, but I don’t find them to be the primary concern.¶ The reactors are purely for energy purposes, but **in a world that seems to be growing tired of U.S. military intervention, the idea of ensuring our ability to do so through the proliferation of mobile nuclear reactors will hardly quell any hostile sentiment**. In addition, it **can only add fire to the “nuclear = good” flame**. So, while **even under best case scenario, the reactors are completely proliferation proof and pose no direct threat to the nonproliferation cause (ignoring the spreading of nuclear tech and knowledge in general),** I have a tough time seeing how it helps.